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TOWARDS A NEW CONCEPT OF 
PARENTHOOD: PROCREATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 
Machteld Vonk1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper focuses on the legal position of children born into families where 
only one of the parents is genetically or biologically related to the child. 
This includes children born into same-sex families as well as children born 
into different-sex families.2 The subject is approached from a comparative 
legal perspective and covers two jurisdictions: England3 and The 
Netherlands. The paper aims to answer the question of what are the 
implications for children born into these families if their current legal 
position is assessed on the basis of the notion that  
- a child’s family situation deserves legal protection;4 and  
- a child should have the possibility to acquire two legal parents.5  
                                                          
1 Researcher at the Molengraaff Institute of Private Law, University of Utrecht, The 
Netherlands. 
2 This paper is an adaptation of the final chapter of the author’s PhD thesis Children and their 
parents: a comparative study of the legal position of children with regard to their intentional 
and biological parents under English and Dutch law, Antwerp – Oxford: Intersentia, 2007. For 
more detail on the subject matter discussed in section 2 of this paper refer to Chapters 3 to 6 of 
the aforementioned book.  
3 English law is a formal ‘term of art’ that describes the law in force in England and Wales. See 
the England and Wales Interpretation Act 1978, Schedule 1. Hereinafter, references to England 
will mean England and Wales. 
4 The ECtHR has established that there may be family life between a child and a non-biological 
parent X.Y.Z. v. United Kingdom; it is however, unclear what the exact position of the ECtHR 
is concerning the relationship between same-sex parents with regard to family life. In Karner 
v. Austria the court stated that “Where the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation was 
narrow, […] the principle of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realized did not merely require the measure chosen to be suitable for realising the aim; it 
also had to be shown that it was necessary to exclude homosexual couples from the scope of the 
legislation in order to achieve that aim.” See M v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions 
[2006] UKHL 11 and WIKELEY (2006) p. 542-547 for the position under English law. See 
FORDER (2002) p. 992-995 for a discussion of Dutch case law on the question whether there can 
be family life between same-sex partners and their children. Also FORDER & SAARLOOS (2007) 
p. 65-74. 
5 This is inherent in both legal systems. A child may not always automatically acquire two legal 
parents, but in both jurisdictions there is the possibility to have the legal parenthood of a 
biological parent established. This notion is confirmed in the Children’s Convention in article 7 
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These two notions are derived from the presumption that it is inherent in 
the legal systems of the two jurisdictions that children in so-called typical 
families with a biological mother and a biological father do have the 
opportunity to acquire two legal parents (legal parenthood) and that their 
family situation is adequately protected (parental responsibility). In both 
jurisdictions the law is in a transition from a parent-centred family law to a 
child-centred family law. In line with this transition the focus must shift 
from the differences between the parents to the equivalent nature of the 
needs and rights of the child. In this context it may be relevant to consider 
the following quote from NUSSBAUM: 
 
“Human beings have a dignity that deserves respect from laws and 
social institutions. This idea has many origins in many traditions; by 
now it is the core of modern liberal democratic thought and practice 
all over the world. The idea of human dignity is usually taken to 
involve an idea of equal worth: rich and poor, rural and urban, 
female and male, all are equally deserving of respect, just in virtue of 
being human, and this respect should not be abridged on account of a 
characteristic that is distributed by whims of fortune. Often, too, this 
idea of equal worth is connected to an idea of liberty: to respect the 
equal worth of persons is, among other things, to promote their 
ability to fashion a life in accordance with their own view of what is 
deepest and most important.”6 
 
It is in essence the dignity of the child, in this case the child born into an 
atypical family that deserves respect.7 This respect is best expressed in 
the law not by stressing the fact that the child’s legal position vis-à-vis 
his or her parents cannot be the same as that of the overall majority of 
children because his or her parents are not the same as those of the 
overall majority of children, but by departing from the notion that all 
children should have the most favourable legal position in life.8 
                                                                                                                                
which concerns the child’s right to know and be cared for by his or her parents. 
6 NUSSBAUM (1999), p. 5. 
7 In this paper a typical family consist of two biological (and genetic) parents and their 
child(ren); an atypical family is a family with one biological and one non-biological parent or a 
family with two non-biological parents. 
8 RAWLS  (1971 ) p. 302.  In Rawls’ theory of justice social and economic inequalities are to be 
arranged so that they are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, See for the 
implications of Rawls’ theory of justice in parent-child relationships DWYER (2006) p. 106-122 
for the theoretical underpinnings of relationship rights for adults and p. 123-169 for the 
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This paper will answer the above question with regard to the legal position 
of children in a family with one biological and one non-biological parent 
(section 2). First, the child’s options to acquire two legal parents will be 
discussed (section 2.1) and then the child’s legal position in his or her family 
(section 2.2). In section 2.3 a possible explanation for the differences and 
similarities between the two jurisdictions will be provided and section 2.4 
will briefly introduce the proposals made in the two jurisdiction with 
regard to same-sex parenthood. Section 3 will introduce a new concept of 
legal parenthood: procreational responsibility. In order to provide the 
framework for this concept the three legal dimensions of the child’s family 
circle are explained in section 3.1. Subsequently, the notion of procreational 
responsibility is expanded upon in order to seek a solution for the 
deficiencies encountered in the law in this area (section 3.2). The new 
concept will then be applied to the legal position of children in families 
with one biological and one non-biological parent and to surrogate families 
(section 4). The paper will close with some recommendations on how to 
proceed in amending existing legislation in this field (section 5). 
 
The majority of this paper is concerned with children born into different-
sex families and female same-sex families, simply because children cannot 
be born into male same-sex families. The male couple will have to engage a 
surrogate mother to conceive and give birth to a child which is genetically 
related to one of the male partners. The position of children in surrogate 
families will be summarily discussed in section 3.3.3. However, where 
relevant, reference will be made to the position of children in male same-
sex families. In both jurisdictions the legal position of children in same-sex 
families is at present subject to (advanced) legislative activity, where 
relevant proposals in this field will be discussed.9 
                                                                                                                                
relationship rights of children. 
9 In England the HFE Bill which contains far reaching amendments to the present HFEA 1990 
was introduced in the House of Lords on 8 November 2007. In The Netherlands the 
Commission of lesbian parenthood and international adoption (Commissie Kalsbeek)  
published its report on lesbian parenthood on 31 October 2007. The government will consider 
the recommendation of the Committee and possibly introduce a Bill on this topic in 
parliament. 
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2. THE LEGAL POSITION OF CHILDREN IN A FAMILY 
WITH ONE BIOLOGICAL PARENT AND ONE NON-
BIOLOGICAL PARENT  
2.1. THE CHILD’S OPTIONS TO ACQUIRE TWO LEGAL PARENTS 
Children in different-sex and female same-sex families 
In both legal systems, children will in general have the possibility to acquire 
two legal parents. In some cases they will acquire them automatically and in 
some cases they acquire one automatically and may acquire another.10 The 
systems in the two jurisdictions are largely in accordance with the following 
notion expressed in the Council of Europe’s White Paper on principles 
concerning the establishment and legal consequences of parentage: “It 
should be underlined that it is in the best interests of the child, first of all, to 
establish parentage as from the moment of the birth and, secondly, to give 
stability over time to the established parentage.”11 Hence the White Paper 
leaves room for social factors to prevail over biological factors: “The law 
may opt not to allow the parentage to be established on the basis of 
biological affiliation, for instance in cases of medically assisted procreation 
with an anonymous donor of sperm.”  
 
That having been said, how about the possibilities for children with one 
biological parent and one non-biological parent to acquire two legal 
parents? The system in England with regard to this question is clear-cut. In 
principle all children have the possibility to acquire two legal parents. 
Children born into a marriage will have two legal parents by operation of 
law; children born outside marriage may have the legal parenthood of their 
biological or HFEA parent12 established by means of a declaration of 
parentage.13   
 
The one exception to this rule is the child conceived with donor sperm in 
accordance with the HFEA 1990 by a single mother or a mother in a same-
sex relationship.14 In the first case there is no other legal parent available 
                                                          
10 VONK (2007) p. 39-90. 
11 Report on principles concerning the establishment and legal consequences of parentage – 
“The White Paper” as adopted on 11-14 May 2004 by the CDJD. 
12 An HFEA parent is a parent who is to be treated as the child’s legal parent pursuant to the 
parenthood provisions in the HFEA 1990. 
13 VONK (2007) p. 147-206. 
14 This is also true for a child conceived by means of post-mortal procreation. The name of the 
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because the biological father is a sperm donor in accordance with the HFEA 
1990 and is thus protected from any claims by children conceived with his 
sperm. In the second case the child can neither establish the legal 
parenthood of the sperm donor nor the legal parenthood of the intentional 
non-biological second parent, because this parent is also a woman. This 
means that the child is entirely dependent on the willingness of the co-
mother to adopt. If the co-mother does not adopt there is no possibility for 
the child to establish the parenthood of this co-mother, despite her role in 
planning the conception and her implicit or explicit consent.  
 
In The Netherlands the situation is less clear.15 This is due to the distinction 
that is made in Dutch law between begetters and sperm donors which is 
based on the question whether or not the biological father has had sexual 
intercourse with the birth mother. Children born into a different-sex 
marriage will have two legal parents by operation of law. Children born 
into any other kind of relationship will not have two legal parents by 
operation of law. Children may establish the legal parenthood of a begetter, 
a man who has had sexual intercourse with their mother. If there is no 
begetter the child may establish the legal parenthood of his or her mother’s 
life partner if this partner consented to an act that may have resulted in the 
conception of the child. The legal parenthood of a sperm donor cannot be 
established by the child, unless he was the mother’s consenting life partner.  
 
The child conceived with donated sperm outside of a different-sex marriage 
may establish the legal parenthood of his or her mother’s partner, if this 
partner is a man and he consented to the conception with donated sperm. If 
the partner is a woman her legal parenthood cannot be established 
regardless of her consent to the conception and her relationship with the 
child’s mother. If there is no consenting male life partner, and the sperm 
donor did not have sexual intercourse with the child’s mother, the child 
cannot establish the legal parenthood of a second parent. On the other 
hand, where the conception occurred outside marriage through intercourse 
with a third party with the consent of the mother’s male life partner, the 
child has a choice whose legal parenthood he may establish, provided of 
course that the legal parenthood of the biological father has not already 
been established.  
                                                                                                                                
child’s father may be registered on the birth certificate, but this has no legal consequences 
(HFEA 1990 s. 29(3B)(a) and (b)). In effect such a child has only one legal parent. The HFE Bill 
does not propose to change this situation.  
15 VONK (2007) p. 147-206. 
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This means that in The Netherlands where a single woman or a woman in a 
relationship with another woman (whether married, in a registered 
partnership or in a non-formalised relationship) makes use of sperm 
donation (without sexual intercourse) the child cannot establish the legal 
parenthood of a second parent. The only means by which the birth mother’s 
female partner can become the child’s legal parent is through adoption. 
However, if the co-mother is unwilling to adopt the child, the child cannot 
make her a legal parent against her will.  
 
In conclusion, with regard to the legal position of children in families with 
one biological parent and one non-biological parent, one can say that almost 
all children in different-sex families have the possibility of acquiring two 
legal parents, whereas this is not true for children in same-sex families.  
Children in male same-sex families  
Since children in male same-sex families are born into another family, they 
have at least one legal parent outside their family. Their legal position 
within their resident family can only be secured by the transfer of legal 
parenthood from the family of their birth to the family in which they are 
being raised. This is an issue that is covered by the provisions on surrogate 
families and adoption and will not be discussed here.  
2.2. PROTECTION OF THE CHILD’S POSITION IN HIS OR HER FAMILY  
Children in different-sex and female same-sex families 
The protection of these children in their families has two sides. On the one 
hand, it concerns the recognition of the fact that the child has a biological 
parent outside his or her resident family, and, on the other hand, the legal 
protection of the child’s position in his or her resident family. This 
protection entails that the child’s resident parents have the rights and duties 
to take care of the child on a daily basis, in practice this means that they 
will have parental responsibility.16 On the basis of the study carried out in 
                                                          
16 It will be attempted to find a solution with the concepts that operate within the present 
system of the law. Creating in-between statuses may lead to first-class and second-class 
parents. As has been established in English case law with regard to unmarried fathers, it is 
important for the child that this parent is given a seal of approval. See for instance Re S 
(Parental Responsibility) [1995] 2 FLR 648; Re H (Parental responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 855 
and Re C and V (parental responsibility) [1998] 1 FLR 392, CA (a parental responsibility order 
is independent from a contact order).  
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this book and the subsequent analysis, the question may be answered 
whether such protection exists in the two jurisdictions at present. 
 
With regard to the first issue: both jurisdictions have introduced legislation 
which ensures that children conceived with donor sperm during assisted 
conception services have a right to information concerning the person and 
the identity of the donor of the genetic material. A register has been set up 
in both jurisdictions to store this information. Furthermore, both 
jurisdictions also recognise that a child has a right to know his or her 
biological/genetic history outside the context of assisted conception 
services. However, there is no register where such information is collected 
and children very much depend on what their parents tell them. 
 
The second part of the question concerns the legal protection of the child’s 
resident family. There is a distinction between children born in a formalised 
relationship and children born in a non-formalised relationship. In The 
Netherlands all married parents and parents who have entered into a 
registered partnership will have parental responsibility with regard to the 
children born into their relationship, unless the child already has a legal 
parent outside the marriage or the registered partnership. Children born in 
non-formalised relationships will have one parent with parental 
responsibility ex-lege: namely their birth mother. The birth mother’s 
partner may acquire parental responsibility, but the complexity of this 
process depends on his or her sex. A male partner may recognise the birth 
mother’s child and subsequently register joint parental responsibility in the 
parental responsibilities register with the birth mother. A female partner 
may only acquire parental responsibility with regard to the child by court 
order on her joint request with the birth mother, or by means of adoption.  
 
In England a child born into a marriage will have two parents with parental 
responsibility. A child born into a civil partnership or in a non-formalised 
relationship will not automatically have two resident parents with parental 
responsibility. The non-biological parent in the child’s resident family may 
acquire parental responsibility, but how this may be done depends on the 
sex of this parent and the status of his or her relationship with the mother 
and the child. The birth mother’s male partner (provided he is an HFEA 
father) may register on the child’s birth certificate with the mother’s 
consent and will subsequently acquire parental responsibility. Alternatively, 
he may also enter into a parental responsibility agreement with the child’s 
mother or apply for a parental responsibility or a residence order. The birth 
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mother’s female partner, provided she has entered into a civil partnership 
with the child’s mother, may enter into a parental responsibility agreement 
with the child’s mother and apply for a parental responsibility order or a 
residence order. A female partner who has not entered into a formalised 
relationship with the child’s mother may apply for a residence order with 
maternal consent or without consent if she has lived with the child for 
three years or if the court gives her leave to do so.   
 
In both jurisdictions the parental responsibility acquired by the non-
biological parent does not cease upon separation. It may be terminated by 
court order (except in England if the non-bio parent is a legal parent and in 
both jurisdictions in the case of adoption), but only subject to the child’s 
interests.  
 
In conclusion, one may say that the position of the child in a family with 
one biological parent and one non-biological parent is well protected in The 
Netherlands in those cases where the child is born into a formalised 
relationship. Furthermore, children born into non-formalised different-sex 
families receive a higher measure of protection than children in non-
formalised same-sex families. In both cases the parents need to undertake 
certain action to acquire parental responsibility, but this is more complex 
for same-sex parents than it is for different-sex parents. This is partially due 
to the fact that the male partner of the child’s mother has access to the 
status of legal parent on the basis of his sex whereas a female partner has no 
access to the status of a legal parent outside the possibility of adoption.  
 
In England there is only parental responsibility by operation of law for 
children born into marriage. With regard to all other children, also those 
born into a civil partnership, the parents need to undertake certain action to 
acquire parental responsibility with regard to the children born into their 
relationship. The nature of the action that needs to be undertaken depends 
on whether the mother’s birth partner is a legal parent, a same-sex parent in 
a formalised relationship or a same-sex parent in a non-formalised 
relationship. The first two kinds of parents may acquire parental 
responsibility without court intervention, the last kind of parent cannot. 
Children in male same-sex families 
In England male same-sex partners who have entered into a civil 
partnership may jointly acquire parental responsibility with regard to the 
children they raise in their family by entering into a parental responsibility 
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agreement with the child’s birthmother, provided one of the men is the 
child’s biological father.17 Furthermore, they may acquire parental 
responsibility on the basis of the fact that the child has been living with 
them for a certain period of time. In The Netherlands male same-sex 
partners who have entered into a formalised relationship (either marriage or 
a registered partnership) will not automatically acquire parental 
responsibility over the children they raise in their family, since the child 
always has a legal parent outside the relationship of the male couple, 
namely the birth mother. Moreover, it is not possible for them to acquire 
joint parental responsibility as long as the child’s mother holds parental 
responsibility. 
2.3. POSSIBLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DIFFERENCES AND 
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE JURIDICTIONS  
When trying to explain the differences in the approach taken in the two 
jurisdictions towards securing the legal position of the child, the differences 
between common law and civil law play an important role in the case of 
legal parenthood. Traditionally, legal parenthood is in both jurisdictions 
based on biology. In the approach taken by the English system this basis 
remains more or less intact because legal parenthood not based on biology is 
regulated in a specific piece of legislation. Due to the lack of statutory 
interference in the field of legal parenthood, the English legislature was able 
to provide for a completely enclosed statutory framework to operate 
alongside, and instead of the existing common law rules. In The 
Netherlands adaptations to developments in society in this area have to be 
made within the existing framework of the Dutch Civil Code. This means 
that legal parenthood for non-biological parents is regulated in the same 
Title in the DCC that also regulates legal parenthood for biological parents. 
Amendments in this area touch the very heart of Dutch law on legal 
parenthood. 
 
The differences in the field of parental responsibility are less likely to be 
explained by the common law-civil law dichotomy. It is far more likely that 
an explanation is to be found with the fact that both jurisdictions are in the 
middle of a process of transforming from the traditional parent-centred 
approach to a child-centred approach. An element of this process is the 
                                                          
17 This is a two-step process: the biological father will first enter into a parental responsibility 
agreement with the birth mother (s. 4 CA 1989). Subsequently, the biological father’s male 
partner may enter into a parental responsibility agreement with the birth mother and the 
biological father (s. 4A CA 1989).  
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recognition of non-legal parents who have a child in their care. This has 
resulted in a loosening of the connection between legal parenthood and 
parental responsibility.18 Such parents may not become legal parents but 
they may be attributed with parental responsibility. How and at what pace 
the transition from a system that assigns children to parents to a system that 
assigns parents to children is made may in part be determined by the legal 
system, but also by politics, pressure groups and other factors.19  
 
Both jurisdictions are striving to give greater recognition to intentional 
parents and other social parents; however, the aim and underlying 
considerations of legislative changes, and thus the results, may differ. A 
prominent example in the field of parental responsibility is the fact that in 
The Netherlands registered partners acquire parental responsibility with 
regard to a child born into their relationship and civil partners in England 
do not. This difference is a consequence of the fact that in England no 
distinction has been made between children born during the civil 
partnership and children born in a relationship prior to the current civil 
partnership. Since in the latter case the child may very well have a legal 
parent with parental responsibility outside this civil partnership, an 
automatic attribution of parental responsibility to the parent’s civil partner 
is not advisable.  
 
Despite the fact that both jurisdictions are in the process of moving from a 
parent-based to a more child-oriented system, it has become obvious from 
section 2.1 and 2.2 that the legal position of children in a number of families 
with one biological parent and one non-biological parent is still far from 
optimal, in particular where children in same-sex families are concerned. 
They have no possibilities to acquire a second legal parent and their parents 
will not always be able to acquire parental responsibility. Is it just that a 
child, through no actions or choices of his or her own, is from the moment 
of his or her birth in a position which is less favourable than the majority of 
                                                          
18 With regard to English law, for instance, WOELKE (2006) p. 100 states that with the 
introduction of the Children Act 1989 “the question of parents’ status or relationship has 
become secondary and the welfare of the child has become paramount in questions 
surrounding all aspects of what was once called custody. As a result the law in England has to 
some extent been flexible enough to adapt to changing family structures.” 
19 See for instance ANTOKOLSKAIA (2006) p. 452: “At the same time, neither can the diversity of 
present-day filiation laws be regarded as merely being diverse in the technical aspect of the 
chosen solution. That is to say, this diversity is based on dissimilar political choices made with 
regard to the position of the parents, rather than merely a matter of dissimilar legal means to 
reach similar ends.” 
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his or her peers? With regard to children born outside marriage this 
question has been answered in the negative,20 but with regard to children 
born into same-sex relationships the answer has not been unequivocally 
negative.  
 
The argument against legal parenthood by operation of law for a consensual 
non-biological mother is that such automatic parenthood fails to take into 
account the possible parenting intentions of the biological father.21 This is in 
itself a reasonable argument and indeed the parenting intentions of the 
biological father, if they exist, need to be considered; but only in those cases 
where such intentions do exist. Nevertheless, when considering the 
intentions of the biological father and the means by which they may be 
taken into account, it should be kept in mind that article 3(1) of the 
Children’s Convention requires the interests of the child to be the primary 
consideration in any actions undertaken, including those undertaken by 
legislative bodies.  
2.4.  BILLS AND PROPOSALS REGARDING SAME-SEX PARENTHOOD  
In both jurisdictions serious attempts are being made to enhance the legal 
position of same-sex parents with regard to the children they raise in their 
family. In England these attempts are at a very advanced stage and concern 
the legal position of children being raised in female same-sex families and of 
children being raised in male same-sex families. On 8 November 2007 the 
HFE Bill which contains numerous amendments to the present HFEA 1990 
including provisions that would grant the birth mother’s female partner the 
status of legal parent by operation of law given that a number of 
requirements be met was introduced in the House of Lords. If the female 
couple has entered into a civil partnership, the female partner will be 
attributed with the status of legal parent by operation of law provided use 
has been made of assisted conception services.22 
 
Furthermore, clause 43 of the HFE Bill proposes to grant female partners 
who have not entered into a civil partnership the same position as different-
sex partners in a non-formalised relationship who make use of assisted 
conception services, by introducing so-called ‘agreed female parenthood 
conditions’. These conditions require both the prospective mother and her 
                                                          
20 See ANTOKOLSKAIA (2006) p. 443-453.  
21 For example for The Netherlands Dutch Second Chamber 26 672/26 673 no. 15 p. 7.  
22 Cl. 42 HFE Bill. 
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female partner to notify the ‘person responsible’23 in writing of their consent 
to the female partner being treated as the child’s legal parent. Furthermore 
the conditions require that neither party has withdrawn consent at the time 
the embryo, the sperm and eggs, or sperm are placed in the woman, nor has 
the woman indicated that she wishes another person (male or female) to be 
regarded as the child’s legal parent.24 The woman and the female partner 
may not be within the prohibited degrees of relationship in relation to each 
other. If either of the parties withdraws consent, the other party must be 
informed. Withdrawal of consent, either by the woman or the female 
partner, will not prevent the woman from continuing the treatment. 
 
The HFE Bill which seeks to amend the status provisions of the HFEA 1990 
to provide for legal parenthood for the mother’s female partner by 
operation of law, also includes amendments to the parental responsibility 
provisions in the CA 1989. The mother’s (female) civil partner will acquire 
parental responsibility if the civil partner is to be treated as a parent by 
virtue of c. 42 of the HFE Bill. Furthermore, where the child was born 
before the couple entered into a civil partnership and the mother’s female 
partner was at that time regarded as the child’s parent pursuant to c. 43 of 
the HFE Bill, the female partner will be attributed with parental 
responsibility upon entering into a civil partnership with the mother.25  
 
The HFE Bill contains provisions with regard to the attribution of parental 
responsibility to female couples who have not entered into a formalised 
relationship. The female partner who is to be treated as a parent pursuant to 
c. 43 of the HFE Bill will be granted the same possibilities with regard to the 
acquisition of parental responsibility as an unmarried father: i.e. automatic 
parental responsibility upon registration on the birth certificate; entering 
into a parental responsibility agreement with the birth mother or applying 
for a court order.26 Furthermore, where a residence order is made in favour 
of such a female partner, the court will also make a parental responsibility 
order pursuant to proposed section 4ZA if the female partner does not 
already have parental responsibility.27  
 
                                                          
23 The ‘person responsible‘ is the person under whose supervision licensed activities are carried 
out. See the Explanatory Note attached to the HFE Bill, p. 30. 
24 Cl. 44-45 HFE Bill. 
25 Section (2)1A(a) and (b) CA 1989 to be inserted after section 2(1) if the HFE Bill is accepted. 
In practice this is equivalent to the legitimacy provisions in relation to marriage. 
26 S. 4ZA CA 1989, to be inserted after section 4 if the HFE Bill is accepted. 
27 S. 12(1A) CA 1989 to be inserted after s. 12(1) if the HFE Bill is accepted. 
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Furthermore, the HFE Bill proposes to amend the provisions for the transfer 
of parental rights after a surrogacy arrangement, the parental order of s. 30 
of the HFEA 1990, in such a manner as to make male and female same-sex 
couples and cohabiting couples eligible for a parental order, provided one of 
the partners of the commissioning couple is genetically related to the child 
and all the other conditions have been met.28 
 
In The Netherlands proposals to strengthen the legal position of children in 
same-sex families are restricted to the position of children growing up in 
female same-sex families and have not yet resulted in a Bill being 
introduced in parliament. In May 2007 the government set up a 
Commission on lesbian parenthood and international adoption which has to 
investigate how the legal position of co-mothers with regard to their 
partner’s children can be improved outside the realm of adoption. The 
committee recommended in its report of 31 October 200729 that co-mothers 
be granted more or less the same legal position with regard to the children 
born during their relationship with the birth mother as an unmarried 
consensual non-biological father. In practice this means that a co-mother 
will not become a legal parent by operation of law, whatever the status of 
her relationship with the birth mother, but that she may become the child’s 
legal parent by means of recognition if the birth mother consents. 
Furthermore, the child and the birth mother will be granted the possibility 
to have the legal parenthood of the co-mother established by court.  
3. PROCREATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY  
In order to conceive of a system that takes into account the child’s interests 
in a solid legal position on the one hand, and the possible parenting 
intentions of both the consensual parent and the biological father on the 
other, the notion of procreational responsibility may be used. In order to 
establish the framework in which this notion may function, it is necessary 
to first introduce the three legal dimensions of the child’s family circle.  
3.1. THE LEGAL DIMENSIONS OF THE CHILD’S FAMILY CIRCLE 
It is relevant at this point to take a closer look at the three legal dimensions 
of the child’s family circle, namely: biological parenthood, legal parenthood 
and parental responsibility.  
 
                                                          
28 Cl. 54 HFE Bill. 
29 COMMISSIE KALSBEEK (2007). 
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I. The first dimension concerns the biological and/or genetic 
parenthood of the child. In the overall majority of cases this 
dimension will contain two parents: a biological father and a 
birthmother, but since the introduction of IVF this dimension may 
contain an additional mother, namely a genetic mother.  
II. The second dimension: legal parenthood may only contain two 
parents in both England and The Netherlands; these parents may or 
may not be the child’s biological or genetic parents.   
III. The third dimension: parental responsibility may consist of only two 
parents in The Netherlands and more than two parents in England, 
these parents may be legal parents or non-legal parents. 
 
Taking into account the role played by these dimensions in the present 
provisions on parent-child relationships and subsequently expanding on 
them somewhat, the following functions may be assigned to the different 
dimensions. Dimension I on genetic/biological parenthood (afstamming) is 
concerned with safeguarding and registering the child’s biological/genetic 
history. This dimension will in principle give access to the dimension of 
legal parenthood, unless the law provides otherwise, for instance in the case 
of egg donation and some forms of sperm donation. Dimension II on legal 
parenthood (ouderschap) is concerned with assigning legal parents to 
children. Legal parenthood, among other things, has consequences for the 
child’s financial position in life, for his or her nationality and for his or her 
position with regard to inheritance law. This dimension is no longer 
exclusively reserved for genetic and biological parents.30 Dimension III on 
parental responsibility is concerned with ensuring that the parents who are 
caring for the child have the rights and duties associated with this task.31 
 
The separation of the three dimensions makes it possible to recognise the 
role played by different parents in the child’s life. The child’s 
biological/genetic history can be protected because the non-biological legal 
parent and the donating biological parent will both be present in the child’s 
family. Whether this presence is limited to the fact that the person-
identifying information of this biological parent is accessible to the child at 
                                                          
30 As BAINHAM (1999) p. 44, concludes on this issue: “It could have been exceptionally neat and 
tidy to say that those with a proven genetic connection are the parents and everyone else gets 
parental responsibility and no more. But this is not the course we have followed in England 
and it is too late to turn back now.”  
31 See CEFL reports on England LOWE (2005) and The Netherlands BOELE-WOELKI, SCHRAMA & 
VONK (2005), for the specific content of parental responsibility in the two countries and the 
CEFL principles with regard to a common approach BOELE-WOELKI et al. (2007b). 
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a later date, depends on the intentions of the parents involved and the 
child’s interests. Furthermore, the separation of the three dimensions also 
allows for the possibility to increase the number of persons who may hold 
parental responsibility with regard to a child, since parental responsibility is 
not necessarily connected with legal parenthood.32 
 
The recommendations made in this paper are based on the ‘two legal parent 
model’, since this model has for a long time had a satisfactory application 
for the overall majority of children.33 This means that where there are 
tensions between biological and consensual non-biological parenthood, 
choices have to be made between possible legal parents. Depending on the 
circumstances and the interests of the child either the biological parent or 
the intentional parent will be the child’s legal parent. The point of 
departure should be, however, that the child’s position in his or her resident 
family will be protected, and third parties outside this resident family will 
be recognised in such a manner that the interest of the child is best served.  
3.2. EXPLANATION OF THE NEW CONCEPT PROCREATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY  
Having made a distinction between genetic/biological parenthood 
(afstamming) and legal parenthood (ouderschap), the question must be 
asked what is the exact delineation between biology-genetic parenthood 
and legal parenthood on the one hand, and intentional parenthood and legal 
parenthood on the other . In order to answer this question it will be useful 
to take a closer look at the concept of procreational responsibility. This 
responsibility has two sides: responsibility before conception and 
responsibility after conception.  
 
Procreational responsibility before conception is concerned with the 
personal integrity of the child to be conceived. This entails ensuring that 
the child’s genetic/biological history is available for the child at a later date, 
and being aware of the fact that the story surrounding his or her conception 
and birth must be accessible and acceptable to the child. Furthermore, this 
responsibility before the child’s conception involves considering who will 
                                                          
32 In The Netherlands the two dimensions have been partially disconnected but this has not 
resulted in changes in the number of persons who may have parental responsibility. In England 
more than two persons may have parental responsibility with regard to a child. 
33 Recently SCHWENZER has proposed a system in which a child would only acquire one legal 
parent by operation of law, namely the birth mother. The legal parenthood of the other parent 
may be established with maternal consent or by court order, subject to the child’s interest. 
SCHWENZER (2006) articles 3.4 to 3.10. 
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have what position in the child’s life when a known donor is used. Not 
everything can be foreseen, but these things need to be thought through 
beforehand. 
 
Procreational responsibility after conception concerns the responsibility for 
the child during its life and is the basis for attributing legal parenthood to a 
parent. It is based on the idea that those persons who are responsible for the 
conception of the child, either because they are a biological parent or 
because they planned and arranged for the conception of the child, should 
be responsible for the child during his or her life. The child must be able to 
depend on the fact that this responsibility may become operational in 
practice. This means that it must be possible to establish a legal relationship 
between the child and the parent on the basis of the parent’s responsibility 
by giving this parent the status of a legal parent. Whether this attribution is 
automatic and how possible conflicts between biological parents and 
intentional parents should be resolved will be discussed in the next section.  
 
When applying the concept of procreational responsibility to the 
contemporary regulations, it becomes obvious that the beginnings of this 
system are already present in both jurisdictions. However, as was concluded 
earlier there are a number of situations in both jurisdictions where only the 
procreational responsibility of the birth mother is recognised and other 
parents, be it biological or intentional, are safeguarded from responsibility 
in the form of legal parenthood. Intentional parents who are willing to take 
on this responsibility may under certain circumstances do so, with the 
consent of the birth mother, but the child him or herself cannot establish 
the legal parenthood of these parents.34 Can this problem be solved through 
bringing the law into line with the idea of procreational responsibility? This 
is the topic of the next section on the legal position of children in families 
with one biological parent and one non-biological parent.  
                                                          
34 To use the words of ARCHARD (1995) p. 104: “The developments I mentioned at the outset – 
in household forms and in reproductive technology – mean that we need to be much clearer 
than we presently are about the principles which should inform the formation of families. If 
blood does not matter, or matters far less than is presumed, it is crucial that we can agree what 
should matter.” Apparently blood in these cases does not matter, but an alternative has not 
been sought.  
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4. APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF PROCREATIONAL 
REPONSIBLITY  
4.1. CHILDREN BORN INTO RELATIONSHIPS WITH ONE BIOLOGICAL 
PARENT AND ONE NON-BIOLOGICAL PARENT 
If the concept of procreational responsibility is applied in the law on legal 
parenthood there are in principle three parents available to fill the two legal 
parent slots: the birth mother,35 the biological father and the intentional 
parent. The law determines or should determine which two parents will fill 
these two slots.36  
 
In the contemporary English system a distinction has been made between 
donations and assisted conception treatment covered by the HFEA 1990 and 
donations outside the scope of the HFEA 1990. Under the HFEA 1990, the 
donor’s intention not to parent and the consensual parent’s intention to 
parent result in the status of a legal parent being attributed to the 
consensual parent. In all cases not covered by the HFEA 1990, the biological 
father is the child’s (potential) legal father. The result of this system is that 
the child may always acquire two legal parents, except where fertility 
treatment in accordance with the HFEA 1990 has been provided to a single 
woman.  
 
In the light of the concept of procreational responsibility it may be 
questioned whether assigning the status of a legal parent to a party outside 
the child’s resident family, who may or may not have parenting intentions, 
is the most appropriate choice. However, this is a question to be answered 
by the English legislature. Assigning legal parenthood to non-biological 
parents outside the scope of the HFEA 1990 would mean a radical break 
with the aims of the HFEA 1990. 
 
In addition to further developments in this field in England, it may be 
worthwhile to adopt the approach taken in The Netherlands and to 
strengthen the position of children in same-sex families by attributing joint 
parental responsibility to civil partners with regard to the children born 
during their civil partnership. Furthermore, it may be made easier for 
unmarried same-sex couples to acquire joint parental responsibility with 
                                                          
35 It has to be noted that the birth mother need not be a genetic parent but she is a biological 
parent by dint of giving birth. 
36 A birth mother is automatically a legal parent even if she is not the child’s genetic mother. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the following sections concern the position of a sperm donor. 
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regard to the children born during their relationship. Proposals to this end 
have been made in the HFE Bill with regard to co-mothers who are to be 
treated as legal parents pursuant to cl. 42 or 43 of the Bill. 
 
The Dutch system is far less clear-cut. If each child is to have the possibility 
of acquiring two legal parents, there are two options. Firstly, a system akin 
to the English system could be adopted. This would mean that a clear 
distinction is made between a donor from a clinic, who may for instance be 
refered to as a genetic father, and non-clinic donors, who will fall into the 
larger group of biological fathers. Only the donors who donate to a clinic 
would be exempted from any rights and duties with regard to the child. All 
non-clinic donors would be regarded as biological fathers whose legal 
parenthood may be established by the child. Secondly, the notion of 
intentional parenthood that is already present in the law where different-
sex couples are concerned, could be expanded to include same-sex parents. 
The system under the second course of action could take two forms based 
on whether the donor’s intentions are taken into account.  
4.1.1. Legal parenthood for intentional parents without evaluating the 
donor’s intentions 
Attribution without regard to the intentions of the donor is the course 
followed in Dutch law at present where married different sex-couples are 
concerned. Extending this presumption of parentage in all formalised 
relationships would result in a simple, clear provision on the legal 
parenthood of children born into any kind of formalised relationship 
regardless of the sex of the parents. 37 With regard to children born outside a 
formalised relationship, the position of the intentional parent (male or 
female) with regard to legal parenthood should be the same as that of a 
biological father.38 This means that either the child, the intentional parent 
or the child’s birth mother can establish his or her legal parenthood.  
 
However, a disadvantage of such a system would be that it leaves no room 
for the evaluation of the donor’s intentions with regard to the child. 
Furthermore, such automatic attribution does not provide an opportunity to 
                                                          
37 This has been proposed by HENSTRA (2002) with regard to married same-sex couples and by 
WORTMANN (1998) for same-sex couples in a registered partnership. See also ROSATO (2006) p. 
74-86 on the United States who argues that children in same-sex families “deserve the security 
blanket of the parentage presumption.” 
38 HENSTRA (2002) p. 180-181 proposed automatic parenthood for the same-sex partner married 
to the birth mother, and recognition for the unmarried same-sex partner.  
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ensure that any person-identifying information about the donor is available 
for the child at a later date.  
4.1.2. Legal parenthood for the intentional parents with regard to the 
intentions of the donor 
The second option concerns a system which makes it possible to evaluate 
the intentions of the donor. Three different scenarios need to be considered 
with regard to the intentions of the donor: 
1. Double consent in a clinical setting; this means that the donor has 
consented to the use of his or her genetic material by third parties 
and the mother’s partner has consented to the use of this material 
for the conception of a child by his or her partner. 39 This consent 
has been given in a clinical setting, which means that DIY donation 
and insemination at home are not included.  
2. The known sperm donor has consented to the use of his sperm and 
will relinquish his parental right to the non-biological parent. The 
non-biological parent has consented to the use of this genetic 
material by his or her partner to conceive a child. This concerns 
cases of DYI donation and insemination at home.  
3. There is the consent of the partner of the non-biological parent to 
the use of third party genetic material by his or her partner for the 
conception of a child. However, there is no clarity about the 
donor’s intentions with regard to the child’s legal parenthood. 
Either because the donor is not known (e.g. sperm has been 
purchased on the internet) or because the donor is unwilling to 
relinquish his parental rights to the non-biological parent.  
 
The distinction made between situations 1 and 2 is the distinction already 
made under English law between an HFEA donor40 and a DIY donor (who is 
a legal father in terms of common law). This distinction as such is not made 
in Dutch law.41 The position of the donor may be clarified in Dutch law if 
the sperm donor who donates to a sperm bank is refered to as a genetic 
father and the other kinds of donors are given a position akin to a begetter.  
                                                          
39 With regard to egg donation and the consent of the egg donor only the first situation is 
relevant, since egg donation always takes place in a clinical setting.  
40 Schedule 3 HFEA 1990. 
41 However, in a Bill concerning adoption that is currently before the Dutch parliament a 
beginning is made by distinguishing between known and unknown donors. It is proposed in 
this Bill that a co-mother who produces a declaration by the Donor Data Foundation stating 
that use has been made of the sperm of an unknown donor, may in principle adopt her 
partner’s child. Dutch Second Chamber 2006-2007, 30 551 1-7. 
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If there is double consent, either because the donation and treatment have 
taken place in a hospital (situation 1),42 or the biological and intentional 
parents have agreed that the child to be conceived will grow up in the 
family of the birth mother and her partner (situation 2), the birth mother 
and the intentional parent will be the child’s legal parents.43 In such a 
system it is vital that there is proof of the parents’ intentions and the 
donor’s consent, to be produced when the child’s birth is registered.44 Such 
proof may for instance consist of consent forms signed at the clinic45 or a 
contract drawn up between the parties involved.46 In case of conflict or in 
case there is no proof of the donor’s intention, the intervention of a court 
may be required to decide on the legal parenthood of the child involved. 
Such a procedure need not be an adoption procedure but may be a new kind 
of procedure aimed at establishing the legal parenthood of the child in line 
with the child’s best interests. It is not necessarily in the child’s interest that 
the legal parenthood of the biological parent is established, although this 
may be the case under certain circumstances.47 It is also very important to 
consider the child’s position in his or her resident family and the wider 
                                                          
42 WORTMANN (2001) p. 235-236 stated that adoption was not appropriate in same-sex 
relationship if use had been made of an unknown donor. 
43 The status of the consent given is a subject for further research. Consent given in a hospital 
after being informed of the consequences of such consent (informed consent) is not the same as 
consent given outside a clinical setting. This latter consent may or may not be informed 
consent.  
44 The Civil Code of Québec (CCQ) makes it possible for a non-biological parent, either male or 
female, to acquire the status of a legal parent if the parties have entered into a so-called 
‘parental project’ for assisted conception, which is defined as the situation “when one person, 
or spouses by mutual consent, decide to conceive by relying on genetic material donated by a 
third party.” CAMPBELL (2007) p. 254. 
45 In The Netherlands proof of the consent of the donor could take the shape of a declaration 
by the Donor Data Foundation that the child concerned was conceived with the sperm of an 
unknown donor. In a proposal concerning adoption that is currently before the Dutch 
parliament such a declaration is also mentioned with regard to the adoption of a child by the 
birth mother’s female partner. Dutch Second Chamber 2006-2007, 30 551, no. 1-8. 
46 Further research into the status of contracts regarding parent-child relationships is required, 
in particular the standing of such a contract in case of conflict. Donor contracts or consent 
forms are sometimes used by courts in adoption proceedings to obtain clarity about the donor’s 
intention. See, for instance, Rechtbank Utrecht, 13 December 2006, LJN: AZ7383 or Rechtbank 
Utrecht, 13 December 2006, LJN: AZ7379. For an example of the use of donor contracts by an 
Australian court see DEMPSEY (2004) p. 76-102. 
47 SHANLEY (2001) p. 146 “Providing children with stability and care is among the most 
pressing needs of contemporary […] society. The primary source (although not the only one) 
of such stability and care is a child’s family.” 
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family circle of the two resident parents.48 Recognition by the law of the 
child’s family situation may facilitate the child’s integration into his or her 
wider family and into society itself. 
 
An advantage of this system is the fact that the donor’s intention may be 
taken into account. Moreover, it makes it possible to require that the 
person-identifying information is made available upon the birth registration 
so that this information can be stored for instance in the donor data register 
for the child’s future use. 
 
Whatever choice is made, the point of departure should be that if there are 
three persons responsible for the conception of a child: the birth mother, 
the biological father and the female partner of the birth mother, it cannot 
be so that the child can only have one legal parent. It should be possible to 
establish the legal parenthood of one of the two other responsible parents, 
either the biological father or the intentional mother. If the law shields the 
biological parent from responsibility in any form with regard to the child, it 
cannot at the same time prevent the intentional parent from becoming the 
child’s legal parent. It cannot be so that both are excluded from legal 
parenthood because of the existence of the other. Furthermore, as is stated 
by article 7 of the Children’s convention, a child has a right to be raised and 
be cared for by his or her parents. If one accepts that on the basis of the 
notion of procreational responsibility parents are not only biological 
parents, but may also be intentional parents, one must conclude that the 
law is obliged to make it possible for a child to acquire two legal parents. 
4.2. CHILDREN IN SURROGATE FAMILIES   
The notion of procreational responsibility may also play a role in the 
context of surrogate parenthood. First of all, because procreational 
responsibility before conception requires the parties to consider the 
consequences of the arrangements about to be made. With regard to 
responsibility after the child is born there is a major difference between 
surrogacy and the assisted conception with donor sperm discussed in the 
previous sections. In the latter case it is the intention that the child remains 
                                                          
48 ARCHARD (1995) p. 105 “It is important to be clear that natural parents have a claim to bring 
up their own children only because such an arrangement is optimal. It is not the case that the 
arrangement is thought best because natural parents have a prior claim to rear their own. This 
is the crucial point. For, when there is a dispute over who should rear a child, the claim of the 
natural parent to have custody over her own does not carry weight simply in virtue of the 
existence of the biological relation. Blood as such does not matter.”  
 22
in the family into which it was born, whereas in the case of surrogacy the 
intention is that the child will be transfered from the family of its birth to 
another family. The intention of the commissioning parents and the 
surrogate parents plus the question of who is genetically related to the child 
may play a part.  
 
With regard to surrogacy a distinction should be made between three types 
of surrogacy: 
1. surrogacy arrangements where the commissioning parents are both 
genetically related to the child carried by the surrogate mother 
(gestational surrogacy); 
2. arrangements where one of the commissioning parents is 
genetically related to the child carried by the surrogate mother 
(gestational or traditional surrogacy depending on whether the egg 
is provided by the surrogate mother);  
3. and cases where neither of the commissioning parents are 
genetically related to the child carried by the surrogate mother 
(gestational or traditional surrogacy depending on whether the egg 
is provided by the surrogate mother).  
 
In the first case, the surrogate mother is not genetically related to the child, 
but in the second and third case she may be, but need not be if use is made 
of a donated egg. This means that if the concept of procreational 
responsibility is applied with regard to the attribution of legal parenthood, 
the concept needs to accommodate a third variable besides biology and 
intention, namely genetic parenthood. In cases where the commissioning 
mother’s egg is used, she is the genetic and intentional mother whereas the 
surrogate mother is the biological mother.  
 
In England the commissioning parents in situations 1 and 2 can become the 
child’s legal parents by means of a parental order if a number of conditions 
are met, one of these being that the surrogate parents consent to the 
transfer of parental rights. In the recently published HFE Bill it is proposed 
to expand the group of commissioning parents who are eligible for a 
parental order to include female and male same-sex couples and co-habiting 
couples.49 In The Netherlands there are no provisions specifically designed 
for the transfer of full parental status in surrogacy cases. Since surrogacy is 
allowed under certain conditions, a provision akin to a parental order may 
                                                          
49 Cl. 54 HFE Bill. 
 23
be considered, in particular in cases where both the commissioning parents 
are genetically related to the child. At present such surrogacy arrangements 
are allowed under supervision after extensive screening, but the 
commissioning parents are left completely in the dark with regard to their 
possibility of becoming the child’s legal parents.  
 
Nevertheless, the most difficult cases are those in which conflicts arise with 
regard to the child. In those circumstances the concept of procreational 
responsibility may play a role in that it allows for intention to be a 
fundament for assigning legal parenthood.50 A commissioning couple who 
are both genetically related and the intention to become the child’s parent 
may from this point of view have a stronger claim than a surrogate mother 
who is not genetically related to the child.  
5. HOW TO PROCEED?  
The situation in England, if the changes to the HFEA 1990 proposed in the 
HFE Bill becomes law, would protect the position of children born into 
families with one biological and one non-biological parent in those cases 
where the parents have made use of assisted conception services in 
accordance with the HFEA 1990. Whether the proposed cl. 42, which 
concerns the legal position of the birth mother’s civil partner, also covers 
the situation where use was made of sperm donated outside the ambit of the 
HFEA is not entirely clear. It is advisable that this is made clear during the 
remainder of the legislative course of the HFE Bill. Where a female couple 
who have not entered into a formalised relationship make use of sperm 
donated outside the ambit of the HFEA 1990, the situation is clear: cl. 43 of 
the HFE Bill does not apply. In those cases the common law rules will be 
applicable. Co-mothers who are to be treated as legal parents pursuant to cl. 
42 or 43 will obtain joint parental responsibility either ex lege or upon 
registration on the birth certificate. 
 
Changes in the legal position of children conceived with donor sperm 
outside the context of the HFEA 1990 may be slow to come. It may require 
legislation outside the context of fertility treatment. Nevertheless, other 
changes may be made to enhance the child’s legal position where the 
intentional parent is not recognised as a legal parent. For instance, by 
extending the applicability of the ‘child of the family’ provisions to couples 
                                                          
50 STEINBOCK (2006) p. 108-115. 
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in an enduring family relationship.51 Thus, after relationship breakdown the 
intentional parent who is not a legal parent, may still be liable for child 
maintenance. 
 
In The Netherlands changes are required to the Dutch Civil Code if it is to 
be brought into line with the notion of procreational responsibility. This 
may be done by further integrating new regulations with regard to children 
conceived with third party genetic material in the already existing 
provision. However, for the sake of clarity it may be advisable to regulate 
the legal position of these children separately.  
 
First of all, Title 11 of Book 1 of the Dutch Civil Code which is currently 
entitled ‘parentage’ (afstamming) should be renamed ‘legal parenthood’ 
(juridisch ouderschap).52 Subsequently, a new Title, Title 11a, should be 
inserted which regulates legal parenthood with regard to children 
conceived with third party genetic material. This new title would include 
provisions based on the same concepts as are used in Title 11, such as 
recognition, judicial establishment of legal parenthood and denial of legal 
parenthood. Furthermore, it should also contain provisions on issues such as 
consent to the conception of the child and the donor’s consent to the use of 
his genetic material by a third party. It may contain a new definition of the 
concepts of sperm donor (genetic father) and biological father as suggested 
earlier on in this paper. And last but not least, it should contain a provision 
which ensures that a child has the right of have access to his or her 
genetic/biological history.  
 
If intentional parents become legal parents with the cooperation of the 
child’s birth mother they should be attributed with parental responsibility.53 
However, where the intentional and biological parent becomes a legal 
parent without the cooperation of the birth mother, such a parent will have 
to apply to a court to be attributed with parental responsibility. 
 
Moreover, it may also include provisions on the transfer of parental status 
pursuant to surrogacy arrangements, where one or both of the 
commissioning parents are genetically related to the child concerned. It 
                                                          
51 S. 105(1) CA 1989. 
52 In Dutch: Titel 11: Juridisch ouderschap; Titel 11a: Juridisch ouderschap bij gebruik van 
genetisch materiaal van derden.  
53 The CEFL suggest that legal parents should have parental responsibility, BOELE-WOELKI et al. 
(2007b) principle 3:5.  
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may in this context be advisable for the legislature to make an inventory of 
developments taking place in England, but also in Sweden,54 New Zealand55 
and Canada56 and possibly other counties that have or are in the process of 
introducing similar legislation in this field.  
 
The recommendations of the Commission on lesbian parenthood57 are a step 
in the right direction but do not meet all the criteria set out above. The 
advantage of not opting for automatic legal parenthood for the co-mother is 
that it will remain possible for lesbian couples to share parenthood with the 
child’s biological father. However, in the present proposals there is virtually 
no room to take the intentions of the biological father/donor into account 
where these are not the same as the intentions of the mother(s). 
Furthermore, little to no effort has been made to ensure that the child will 
have access to his or her biological/genetic history once he or she has 
reached the age of majority.  
 
In conclusion, it may be said that despite the fact that serious efforts are 
made to enhance the legal position of children in same-sex families in both 
jurisdictions, the proposals are not entirely compliant with the concept of 
procreational responsibility. In England the position of children born after 
DIY donation in a non-formalised female same-sex relationship remains 
unchanged. Furthermore, the legal position of children born after DIY-
donation in a civil partnership needs further clarification. In The 
Netherlands the recommendations made only concern children born into 
female same-sex families and do not consider the legal position of children 
growing up in male same-sex families. If legislative reform in this area is 
approached with the underlying notion in mind that a child deserves the 
most favourable legal position in life and in his or her family, it may be so in 
the near future that the family is truly made to fit the child and not the 
child to suit the family. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
54 See for instance JÄNTERÄ-JAREBORG (2006) for the present situation in Sweden. 
55 See for instance ATKIN (2006) p. 311-317 on the situation in New Zealand. 
56 See CAMPBELL (2007) p. 242-273 for the situation in Quebec. 
57 COMMISSIE KALSBEEK (2007). 
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